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GROUP LEGAL SERVICES: FROM HOUSTON
TO CHICAGO
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of several amendments to the Code of Professional
Responsibility' at the ABA's recent midwinter convention in Chi-
cago ended a year of dramatic change in the development of group
legal services. The change began at the prior midyear meeting in
Houston where the necessity of changing the provisions of the 1969
Code dealing with group legal services was no longer an issue. The
question was, what would replace them. The existing provisions
had prohibited virtually all advertising by individual practitioners
and group legal plans. 2 They also limited group legal services to
"those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires
the allowance of such legal service activities."3  This restriction was
subject to heavy editorial attack 4 and was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court,5 which held that "collective activity under-
taken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment."6
With the demise of the 1969 provisions came a shift in the scene
of battle between proponents and opponents of group legal services.
Opponents originally focused their criticisms on the advertising
which would accompany group legal plans, charging that it would
destroy the dignity of the profession, 7 and stir up litigation.8 These
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 1969 [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
2. Id., Disciplinary Rules 2-101 [hereinafter cited as DR]. Limited
exceptions are found in DR2-102(A) and DR2-103 (C): professional cards,
announcement cards, signs on or near the door, letterheads, phone listings,
reputable law lists, and requests for referrals from a bar association oper-
ated or approved referral service.
3. Id., DR2-103(D) (5).
4. Nahstall, Limitations on Group Legal Services Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR2-103(D)(5), 48 TEXAS L. REv. 334 (1970);
Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfill-
ing its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEXAs L. REV. 285 (1970).
5. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
See UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of
Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
6. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971).
7. ABA CODE, CANON 2 n.22.
8. Id. at n.24. For a discussion of the common law offenses of barra-
try, maintenance, and champerty, see P. WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPm-
ACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL Paocss (1921). In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
views were challenged as not applicable to either group legal ser-
vices or the profession as a whole.9 'The challenges subsided by
the time the convention opened in Houston, where the delegates
agreed on the legitimacy of group legal services and on their right
to advertise. 10 The delegates split however, over whether certain
415, 439 (1963), the Court ruled that prohibitions against these practices
could not be used to prevent the NAACP from soliciting plaintiffs because
the element of maliciousness, the essence of the common law rules, was ab-
sent.
9. Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attor-
neys and Advertising, 8 HARv. CIV. RICHTS-CIV. Las. L. REv. 77 (1973); Com-
ment, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
Probably the oldest complaint against advertising and solicita-
tion is that their existence would lead to 'stirring up' litigation.
This objection was based on the medieval attitude that litigation
was an evil in itself. It was thought that a person 'stirring up'
a lawsuit would be particularly likely to control the outcome
through corruption of the courts. This notion has been largely dis-
credited, but it apparently still survives in a modified form. The
modern version holds that the courts exist only for those who are
sufficiently aggrieved to pursue their remedies independent of any
outside influence. This theory emphasizes the peace of the commu-
nity, looking upon litigation as a socially disruptive means of set-
tlement. In fact, however, such a view discriminates against the
poor, ignorant, and timid in favor of the wealthy, knowledgeable,
and aggressive.
Comment, Advertising, Solicitation, and Prepaid Legal Services, 40 TENN.
L. REv. 439, 450 (1973).
10. Prior to the Houston convention, ABA CODE, DR2-103 (C) read:
A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recom-
mend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner,
or associate, except that he may request referrals from a lawyer
referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar associa-
tion representative of the general bar of the geographical area in
which the association exists and may pay its fees incident thereto.
The revision adopted at Houston allowed a lawyer to cooperate with any
group legal services plan and to perform legal services for the group's mem-
bers recommended to him. For the text of the amendment see Appendix
1 infra.
The revised DR2-101 (B) made a major change in the rules relating to
advertising. Although advertising remains generally prohibited, the new
provision carves out an exception for group legal services. For the text
of the amendment see Appendix 1 infra. All plans whether open or closed
are allowed to commercially advertise the availability and nature of their
services, as long as no lawyer is identified by name. This amendment is
vital if group legal services are to meet the needs of moderate income
Americans, for there is little value in a group legal services plan if the pub-
lic never hears of its existence. The new DR2-101 (B) (6) allows biographi-
cal data of the sort allowed in law lists, to be given to plan members and
beneficiaries. DR2-102 (A) (6) allows law lists to include:
name, including name of law firm and names of professional asso-
ciates; addresses and telephone numbers; one or more fields of law
in which the lawyer or law firm concentrates; a statement that
practice is limited to one or more fields of law; a statement that
the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law or
law practice but only if authorized under DR2-105 (A) (4); date and
place of birth; date and place of admission to the bar of state and
federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees,
and other scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; mil-




types of plans, due to the presence of lay intermediaries, would re-
sult in conflicts of interests due to demands on the lawyer from
both the legal services organization and the client. This argument
manifested itself in the debate over open and closed panel group
legal services plans."
At the Houston convention the area of hottest debate was
whether uniform rules should be applied to both open and closed
panel plans or whether closed plans should be subjected to greater
restrictions. Uniform regulations were offered by the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, while dis-
criminatory regulations were proposed by the General Practice Sec-
tion.12 When the matter came to a vote, a narrow victory was re-
corded for the amendments offered by the General Practice Sec-
tion.11 Consumers, 14 labor unions, 1 the Justice Department,' 6 and
certain segments of the bar were quick to criticize the results.'
7
Both the wisdom and the integrity of the ABA were questioned.' 8
The bar's continued ability to regulate itself became a source of
controversy since economic motives appeared to have triumphed
over the profession's tradition of public service. "'
As a result of the criticism, no state had adopted the Houston
amendments at the time of the ABA annual meeting in Honolulu.20
11. Under the typical closed panel plan a member is assigned a staff
attorney, whose salary is paid by the legal services organization. Under
an open plan a member selects an attorney from the general bar, who is
then paid by the organization. Various combinations of open and closed
plans exist. For example, some plans may allow a member to select the
attorney, but the pool he may select from is restricted. Both open and
closed plans may be categorized as prepaid legal plans. Members pay on
a regular basis, much as they would pay for medical insurance. On the
controversy over open and closed panel plans, see Transcript of Proceedings
of the National Conference on Prepaid Legal Services, 1973; Transcript of
Proceedings of the National Conference on Prepaid Legal Services, 1972.
12. SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1974
ANNUAL MEETING, Report No. 105 at 2 [hereinafter cited as HONOLULU
REPORT].
13. The vote was 144-117. Id. at 1.
14. Memorandum from John V. Tunney, Chairman, U.S. Senate Sub-
committee on Representation of Citizen Interests, to State and Local Bar
Ass'ns, re Revisions to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, May
28, 1974, at 3, 11 [hereinafter cited as Tunney Memorandum].
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 2; Wilson, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid
Legal Services Plans Get an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60
A.B.A.J. 791 (1974).
17. Tunney Memorandum, supra note 14, at 9; HONOLULU REP'Or,
supra note 12, at 2.
18. Tunney Memorandum, supra note 14, at 4, 11.
19. Id. at 7.
20. HONOLULU REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
At the meeting, the House of Delegates adopted a resolution that
a special committee be formed to examine the Houston amend-
ments in light of the need of a vigorous independent bar, relevant
federal statutes, the mandates of the Supreme Court, and the duty
of the bar to provide needed legal services. 21 State bar associations
were notified of the delegates' dissatisfaction with and intention
to reevaluate the amendments and were advised to proceed ac-
cordingly.
22
At the Chicago convention the special committee made its
recommendations for amending the ABA Code. The amendments
remove the discriminatory restrictions placed on closed panel plans
at the Houston convention. They were adopted by the unanimous
voice vote of the House of Delegates; 23 the vote can be interpreted
as the product of the criticism of the preceding year. It is unlikely
that all criticism will stop however, because of the restrictions on
profit oriented plans voted by the delegates.
This Comment will review the ethical and constitutional issues
involved in the regulation of group legal services and apply them
in analyzing the Houston and Chicago amendments. The Chicago
Amendments may not be the final answer to the problem of how
to regulate group legal services. They represent, however, a signifi-
cant improvement over the Houston amendments.
II. PROFESSIONAL DUTY AND T=E AVAILABILITY
OF LEGAL COUNSEL
A. The Profession's Duty to Meet the Demand for Legal Services
A primary duty of the profession is found in Canon Two of
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: "A Lawyer Should
Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available. '24 This duty is rooted in the nature of our
society, which, due to the pervading presence of laws and regula-
tions, makes lawyers indispensable. Professor Cheatham wrote:
The need for a lawyer leads to the legal right to coun-
sel. Yet, the legal right alone is not enough .... The
same ethical and practical factors that are the basis of the
legal right go beyond it and create the moral right to coun-
sel in situations beyond the legal right. While it is im-
portant that there be the right to counsel under the law, it
is even more important that counsel be available in fact.25
21. SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HouSE OF DELEGATES, 1974
ANNuAL MEETiNG, Summary of Action at 8.
22. Recommendation of the Pa. Bar Ass'n Special Comm. to Review
the Houston Amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility,
adopted Aug. 21, 1974.
23. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 17, col. 1.
24. ABA CODE, CANON 2.




As guardians of the law, this public need of legal services cre-
ates a parallel duty among lawyers to insure the availability of
counsel. This duty is active, not passive. An attorney cannot fulfill
this duty by sitting in his office and waiting for clients to seek
his wisdom. The needs of the public can only be met if legal prob-
lems are recognized as such. "Certain situations or actions may
objectively give rise to legal problems, but the individuals experi-
encing such events may not perceive them as generating problems
of a legal nature. '26 The profession's traditional response to this
problem has been to impose on attorneys the duty to assist laymen
in recognizing legal problems.
27
This response, while praiseworthy, would not be a solution to
the problem even if carried out on a massive scale. This is because
two variables in addition to problem recognition determine whether
the public's legal needs will be met. The first is the accessibility
of lawyers. This includes lack of personal contact with lawyers,
which not only creates difficulties in finding legal help for a spe-
cific problem, but also may stimulate in the layman an actual fear
of walking into a forbidding office to see a lawyer he does not
know.28 The other, and most important variable, is the cost of legal
services.29 "The public has long regarded legal services as a matter
of economics, and too many have been either unable or unwilling
to pay the price to purchase them. . .. "30
These three variables-problem recognition, accessibility and
cost-are the primary reasons why people fail to seek legal ser-
26. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 424 (1965).
27. ABA CODE, ETmcAL CoNsiD-aRAToN 2-2 [hereinafter cited as EC]
reads:
The legal profession should assist laymen to recognize legal
problems because such problems may not be self-revealing and
often are not timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers acting under
proper auspices should encourage and participate in educational
and public relations programs concerning our legal system with
particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Such
educational programs should be motivated by a desire to benefit
the public rather than to obtain publicity or employment for par-
ticular lawyers. Examples of permissible activities include prep-
aration of institutional advertisements and professional articles for
lay publications and participation in seminars, lectures, and civic
programs. But a lawyer who participates in such activities should
shun personal publicity.
28. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 35
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTENSEN].
29. Id. at 33.
30. Report of the Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services,
94 A.B.A. REP. 694, 703 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Report].
vices.-31 The profession must realize that a lawyer's work is a mar-
ketable commodity and that demand for it among people of moder-
ate incomes is highly elastic.
It does not disparage, cheapen, nor 'commercialize' the
legal profession to treat its work product as an economic
commodity. Indeed, it is essential to the well-being of the
profession and the public to be served, that it be acknowl-
edged as such. We cannot longer refuse to recognize that
legal services unpurchased are generally unperformed,
with resulting loss to the public and the profession.3 2
For the profession to fulfill its duty, that duty must be ap-
praised realistically and translated into economic terms. The prob-
lem then becomes one of marketing:3 3 creating organizations and
structures which will increase the demand for legal services until
the actual needs of the American people are met. The bar has ade-
quately served upper income Americans and business, 4 while cor-
rective legislation "has assisted some of the poorest clients.13 5 The
moderate income American, however, has been left out. Group
legal services seek to fill this gap by overcoming the public's un-
familiarity with legal rights, by increasing the accessibility of law-
yers and, especially, by reducing the cost of legal services. These
plans are the most effective means yet developed of reaching these
goals.
3 6
B. Group Legal Services and Professional Ethics
"The lawyer-client relationship has traditionally been the
foundation of law practice. This highly personal relationship in-
volves elements of fidelity, confidentiality, individual responsibility
and professional independence."3 7 This relationship is recognized
in Canon Five which reads, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Inde-
pendent Judgment on Behalf of a Client." s Independence of judg-
ment is key to the subject of group legal services.3 9 This is because,
while the delivery of legal services is important, the quality of those
services is no less so.
It is argued quite logically that "[t] he desires of a third person
will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless that person is in a
position to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon
31. Id. at 704.
32. CBRISTENSEN, supra note 25, at 38.
33. 1969 Report, supra note 30, at 703.
34. CMSTENSEN, supra note 25, at 39.
35. Ferran & Snyder, Antitrust and Ethical Aspects of Lawyers' Mini-
mum Fee Schedules, 7 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE, AND TRUST J. 726, 734
(1972); Nahstall, Limitations on Group Legal Services Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR2-103(D)(5), 48 TExAs L. REv. 334 (1970).
36. 1969 Report, supra note 30, at 704.
37. CMHSTENSEN, supra note 28, at 225.
38. ABA CODE, CANON 5.
39. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 28, at 264.
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-the lawyer." 40 These pressures are less likely to be effective when
the lawyer is financially independent of third parties.41 The bar
generally has had no fear of open panel programs. Open panel plan
members select their own attorneys with the organization doing
little more than paying a member's legal costs. Under such an ar-
rangement the opportunity for interference with an attorney's pro-
fessional judgment would be minimal. With closed panel plans,
however, it has often been feared that the attorney's first loyalty
would be to the organization which employs him42 and that attor-
neys would be told how to handle cases. 43 Closed panel plans, it
is argued, could destroy the lawyer's undivided loyalty to the inter-
est of his client.44 Although a possibility of interference with an
attorney's judgment exists, and \should not be ignored, neither
should it be given undue weight. Speculation aside, there is no
evidence that such arrangements have actually interfered with at-
torneys' professional judgment.
45
Ethical considerations also require that the economic fears of
the small practitioner give way to the public good to be derived
from group legal services.46 While resistance to change must al-
ways be expected, 47 much of the opposition to group plans has been
economically motivated, designed to limit competition.48 This op-
position has come largely from independent practitioners and small
40. ABA CODE, EC5-21.
41. ABA CODE, EC5-22 reads:
Economic, political, or social pressures by third persons are less
likely to impinge upon the independent judgment of a lawyer in
a matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and his
professional work is exclusively with his client. On the other hand,
if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he
may feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than his client.
42. Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1358
(1966).
43. SUMMARY OF AcTION AND REPORTS To THE HousE or DELEGATES, 1974
MIYEAR MEETING, Report No. 118, EC2-2.
44. Memorandum from the General Practice Section to the House of
Delegates Regarding the Ethics Committee's Proposed Amendments to DR2-
103 (D) of the Code, at 3 (Feb. 1974).
45. CmISTENSEN, supra note 28, at 262.
46. Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179,
1187 (1970).
47. Successful lawyers are successful and effective under the
system they know. It requires an uncommon effort to contemplate,
much less support, a changed professional system, and old convic-
tions give way very slowly before new evidence.
CHEATHAM, supra note 25, at 64.
48. Nahstall, Limitations on Group Legal Services Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR2-103(D) (5), 48 TEXAs L. Ray. 334 (1.970).
firms.49 The opposition has been not only to group legal services,
but also to legal services for the poor50 and military legal services.5
A study of military legal aid offices showed, "[t]he strength of
resistance to the pilot program was greater the closer the program
came to a bar that considered its livelihood. . . threatened.
52
Economic considerations may tempt some lawyers "to use the
code of ethics as a weapon,"5 3 a practice which should not be
tolerated. The Special Committee on the Availability of Legal Ser-
vices met the economic issue head on, stating:
One basis of concern is the frank fear that an increase
in groups offering to their members the services of a law-
yer will result in a shift in the economics of the profes-
sion-that law business now enjoyed by some private prac-
titioners may go to other lawyers retained or employed by
groups. Such a result is, of course, possible. No lawyer,
however, has a vested right to retain his clientele or any
particular part of it. If a portion of a privately practicing
lawyer's clientele. . . freely chooses to associate itself with
a group arrangement because of the better quality or
greater economy or easier accessibility of the legal services
to be obtained through the group, then that benefit to the
public cannot properly be opposed by the Bar. Any at-
tempt by the Bar to protect the economic interests of a
particular lawyer when the public would have it otherwise
is unworthy of the Bar."
4
C. Setting Restrictions on Group Legal Services
In setting restrictions on group legal services plans, it is neces-
sary to note that no rules have intrinsic value. Rules have value
only insofar as they advance the duty of the profession to serve
the public. They are merely a means to that end and must be
changed when conditions change.5 Just as large law firms de-
veloped at an earlier time to better serve their clients' needs, the
current development of group legal services must be seen as a
proper response to the public's changing needs. 50
Negative restrictions on lay intermediaries designed to protect
the independent judgment of a group lawyer at some point must
come into conflict with the profession's positive duty to make legal
services available. Although a careful balancing of these conflict-
49. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons
as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 244, 262 (1968).
50. Note, Neighborhood Law Offices, 80 HAnv. L. Rxv. 805, 843 (1967).
51. MARKS, MILITARY LAWYER, CIVILIAN COURTS AND THE ORGANIZED
BAR (1972).
52. Id. at 79.
53. Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179,
1187 (1970).
54. 1969 Report, supra note 30, at 704-05.
55. CHrAHiwm, supra note 25, at 70-71.
56. Cm sENi, supra note 28, at 226.
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ing interests is required, the affirmative duty must take prece-
dence.5 7 Total abolition of group legal services or overdrawn re-
strictions, although easy solutions, ignore the counterbalancing con-
sideration of providing legal services. Restrictions must not be
based upon mere possibilities of impropriety, especially where im-
portant rights such as the availability of legal services are at stake.
Rather, restrictions should be narrowly drawn and aimed directly
at undesirable practices. Restrictions designed to thwart group
legal services in general cannot be justified.5 8
III. GROUP LEGAL SERVICES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE
Ethical considerations of professional duty support the con-
cept of focusing restrictions on specific unethical practices of group
legal services organizations. While ethics urge such a view, the
United States Supreme Court compels it.9 The basis for the High
Court's stance is the first amendment, 0 applied to the states
through the fourteenth!' l The Court has found "that collective ac-
57. "Surely the opposite approach is the right one, with the affirmative
guiding and controlling the negative." CHEATHAm, supra note 25, at 80.
58. [A] typical statute would prohibit fee splitting between
the organization and the attorney. The purpose of such a statute
is to prevent the possibility of a detrimental effect on the attorney-
client relationship by the influence of a financially interested or-
ganization. The obvious way to eliminate this problem would be
to prohibit such financially motivated influences rather than pro-
hibit all financial connections. The former standard goes to the
real question of the conflict, while the latter goes to a broader issue
of any financial connection regardless of the intent or harm that
is realistically probable.
Note, Legal Ethics, 20 KAN. L. REV. 310, 323 (1972). On treating violations
by organizations on a case-to-case basis see Zimroth, Group Legal Services
and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966, 976 (1967).
59. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Ry.
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
60. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Micl, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Brother-
hood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
61. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 444 (1963).
An alternative constitutional basis for the protection of group legal
services can be found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The lenient "rational relation" test normally applied by the
courts yields when "classification systems are found to be 'suspect' or ap-
ply to 'fundamental' interests. In either case, the classification system can
be sustained only if it is 'shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
state interest," Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession:
tivity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fun-
damental right within the protection of the First Amendment.
'6 2
Although this right is not enumerated in the first amendment, it
is implied from its intimate association with the rights of speech
and assembly,63 and is based most directly on the right to petition
for redress of grievances.6 4 "The grievances for redress of which
the right to petition was insured" are not only political.6 5 "Great
secular causes, with small ones, are guarded."6 6  From this right
to litigate is derived the right to associate to gain access to the
courts.6 7 If citizens are not allowed to associate to acquire afford-
able legal services and, thus, are excluded from the courts, the right
to petition is effectively destroyed. Indirect restraints on group
legal services, therefore, cannot be sanctioned: "The First Amend-
ment would . . . be a hollow promise if it left government free to
destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no
law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly
as such."68
The right to associate to obtain legal services does not deny a
state the power to regulate the bar to prevent abuses.69 Neverthe-
Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 77, 99
(1973), and if a less restrictive alternative cannot be found. Goodpaster,
The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indi-
gent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223, 242 (1970).
... This stricter standard could be applied to restrictions on group legal
services since the Court has declared that the right to collective activity
to obtain legal services is fundamental. United Transp. Union v. State Bar
of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 586 (1971). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), fees and court costs, which prevented indigents from obtaining
divorces, were held to be unconstitutional. "Where money determines not
merely 'the kind of trial a man gets' [citation omitted], but whether he
gets into court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a
mockery." Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., concurring). There is no logical distinc-
tion between court costs which deny access to the courts to those who can-
not pay them and Code restrictions which deny people affordable legal
counsel. In each case, access is a matter of economics.
62. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971).
63. Id. at 578-79; UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-
22 (1967). In that this right is not specified in the Constitution but is
founded on the combination of other enumerated rights, it is analogous to
the right of privacy found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
64. UJMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Com-
ment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Adver-
tising, 8 HMRv. Civ. RiGHTs-Crv. Lms. L. R v. 77, 86 (1973).
65. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
66. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
67. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971). "The State can no more keep these workers from using their co-
operative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means
to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights.
The right to petition them cannot be so handicapped." (Brotherhood of Ry.
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
68. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
69. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6
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less, restrictions on first amendment freedoms must meet certain
standards. These standards were reviewed in United States v.
O'Brian:70
To characterize the quality of the governmental interests
which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount;
cogent; strong; (citations omitted). Whatever imprecision
inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest, if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the expression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction of alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
71
Under the rational relation test "usually associated with substan-
tive due process, '72 a state probably could implement broad prohibi-
tions against group legal services. 73 The stricter standard of a com-
pelling state interest must be met, however, when fundamental
rights are involved.74 This standard has often been applied to the
regulation of first amendment freedoms, 75 and must be applied to
group legal services since this collective activity is a fundamental
right.7
6
To meet the requirements of United States v. O'Brien,77 restric-
tions in furtherance of an important governmental interest must
be narrowly drawn to limit the constitutionally protected activity
as little as possible. Restrictions, to avoid overbreadth, must be
aimed at specific undesirable practices. "Precision of regulation
[is] the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms."7 8  In addition, the evil to be prevented must be actual
(1964).
70. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
71. Id. at 377.
72. Comment, The Bar as Trade Association, 5 HAEV. CIV. RIGHTs-CIV.
LIs. L. REv. 334, 359 (1970).
73. The possibility of conflicts of interest caused by the presence of
lay intermediaries probably would supply a rational relation for these
amendments.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945).
75. "The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting first amendment free-
doms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
76. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971).
77. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
78. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
and not theoretical. 79 Restrictions on speech "must be justified by
clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by
clear and present danger."80
Thus, regulation of group legal plans must further a substantial
state interest, restrict protected activity as minimally as possible,
and avoid prohibitions of innocent activity based on theoretical pos-
sibilities of abuse. It is not surprising that this standard of regula-
tion is the same as was derived from the duty of the profession
to make legal services available."' Both the duty to provide legal
services and the constitutional rights to associate to gain access to
the courts are rooted in the great need of attorneys in American
society.82
IV. THE HOUSTON AMENDMENTS
The agreement achieved at Houston in regard to the legitimacy
of group legal services and their right to advertise ended when dis-
criminatory restrictions on closed panel plans were considered.
This clash can be seen in the differences between the amendments
offered by the Ethics Committee and the General Practice Section.83
The Ethics Committee defined a qualified legal assistance organiza-
tion as any office or organization listed in DR2-103.8 4 Besides legal
aid offices, military assistance offices, referral services and bar asso-
ciation representatives, this definition included both open and
closed panel plans and would have led to a uniform treatment of
all group legal services plans. The General Practice Section how-
79. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
80. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 520 (1945).
81. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
83. At the Houston convention four series of recommendations for
amending the ABA CODE were offered. The first three were offered by the
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Series One
consisted of "housekeeping" amendments unrelated to the subject of group
legal services. Series Two consisted of recommendations agreed upon by
both the Ethics Committee and the General Practice Section. Series Three
consisted of amendments to DR2-103 and DR2-104 with which the General
Practice Section disagreed. Series Four was offered by the General Prac-
tice Section as an alternative to Series Three. All four series are found as
the last report in SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS To THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES, 1974 MIDYEA MEETn.
At the convention, the House of Delegates adopted Series One, Two,
and Four. SUMMARY OF AcroN" AND R EPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
1974 MIDYEAR MEETING, Summary of Action at 3.
The text of Series Two and Four, hereinafter cited as the HOUSTON
AMENDMENTS, is found in Appendix 1 infra.
84. SUMMARY OF AcTION AND REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1974
MIDYEAR MEETING, substitute amendments to the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, Series Three, DzFiNmrION No. 8.
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ever, defined a qualified organization as a DR2-103(D) (l)-(4)
organization or one:
[W]hich recommends, furnishes, renders or pays for legal
services to its members or beneficiaries under a plan oper-
ated, administered or funded by an insurance company or
other organization which plan provides that the members
or beneficiaries may select their counsel from lawyers rep-
resentative of the general bar of the geographical area in
which the plan is offered.8
The pool of lawyers would be no smaller than three hundred or
twenty percent of those licensed to practice in the area where the
plan is offered, whichever is greater. 86 Clients were to choose their
own counsel, which made it clear that only open panel plans were
to be considered qualified legal assistance organizations.
The rationale for discrimination against closed plans is sum-
marized in Ethical Consideration 2-33,87 adopted at Houston. Al-
though the consideration acknowledges the Supreme Court's protec-
tion of "plans which do not provide free choice in the selection of
attorneys, '8 8 it charged that the presence of lay intermediaries in
such plans would result in conflicts of interest which would affect
an attorney's independence and ability to serve his clients. The
consideration states: "It is probable that attorneys employed by
groups will be directed as to what cases they may handle and in
the manner in which they handle the cases referred to them."89
It is also argued that closed plans may hire incompetent attorneys
for greater economy. These fears are not shared by the proponents
of closed plans and have been characterized as a "deep but mis-
guided concern for the independence of the legal profession"90 and
as "wholly unsupported by the record in any of the cases before
the Supreme Court and. . . belied by the experience of many law-
yers who have practiced with or in opposition to closed panel
plans.""'
The fears of the General Practice Section resulted in several
specific restrictions on closed panel plans. Keeping in mind the
ethical and constitutional framework which was previously de-
85. HOUSTON AMENDMENTS, DEFINITION No. 8 (emphasis added); see
Appendix 1 infra.
86. Id., DEFINITION No. 8; see Appendix 1 infra.
87. Id., EC2-2, see Appendix 1 infra.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. McCalpin, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal
Services Plans Get An Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A.J.
791,795 (1974).
91. Id.
veloped, it is submitted that the Houston amendments that re-
stricted closed panel plans do not meet the test of being narrowly
drawn to restrict constitutionally protected activity as minimally
as possible.
The first restriction is the prohibition of so-called "feeder sys-
tems" found in the second sentence of DR2-104(A) (3).92 The
amendment prevents a lawyer who serves a client under a closed
plan from later accepting employment from that client on any legal
matter not covered by the plan. This prohibition allegedly prevents
"hucksterism and overreaching."93  Dangers envisioned include
that of a group attorney who, after winning the confidence of a
plan member, uses his position to take advantage of the member.
Also envisioned is the using of a group plan to solicit legal business
for an attorney's private practice.9 4 While such behavior should
be prohibited, a total prohibition of any representation of a member
by a group plan attorney on non-plan matters is a classic example
of an overdrawn restriction. In addition to prohibiting unethical
conduct, it restricts closed panel plans by banning innocent be-
havior. Even though a group member had received good service
from a group attorney and a true lawyer-client relationship had
developed, the attorney would be prohibited from representing the
member on non-plan matters. A narrower approach would ban
only "hucksterism and overreaching," i.e. the blameworthy ac-
tivity.
Another restriction is found in DR2-104(A) (2).95 It allows a
lawyer to:
accept employment that results from his participation in
activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal
problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to
utilize available legal services if such activities are con-
ducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance organi-
zation.98
The language of the text makes an exception only for open panel
plans; the General Practice Section's definition of qualified organi-
zations excludes closed plans. The restriction prohibits a closed
panel attorney from accepting private employment resulting from
his participation in group organized legal educational activities and
is allegedly grounded on fears that an attorney will use these activi-
ties to solicit business. If fears of ethical conflict truly existed, how-
ever, the same restrictions should have been applied to open plans
92. HOUSTON AMENDMENTS, DR2-104(A) (3); see Appendix 1 infra.
93. Smith & Fisher, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid
Legal Services Plans Get an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60
A.B.A.J. 791, 795 (1974).
94. SUMMARY OF ACTION AND REPORTS TO THE HOUSE op DELEGATES, 1974
MIDYEAR MEEwrxG, Report No. 118, at 18.




as well as closed ones since the same possibility for abuse is present.
As the provision was applied in a discriminatory manner, the
amendment's main purpose appears to be the obstruction of closed
panel plans rather than the prevention of any specific unethical
practice. Even admitting the possibility for abuse, restrictions on
solicitation are more direct and do exist.
9 7
Other amendments whose main purpose is the restriction of
closed panel plans are DR2-103(D)(5)(a)(i)-(ii). 98  The amend-
ments require that the primary purpose of organizations operating
closed plans cannot be the recommending, furnishing, rendering
of or paying for legal services, and that the services must be only
incidental and reasonably related to the primary purpose of the or-
ganization.9 9 These amendments restrict permissible closed panel
plans to those reasonably related to large, non-legal parent organi-
zations; 100 only then could legal services be an incidental function
of the organization while remaining reasonably related to its pur-
poses. Such a restriction obviously prohibits interested groups
from forming organizations to secure better legal representation.
There seems to be no real connection between these amendments
and any valid ethical consideration.10 1 Some attorneys argue that
there is a greater risk of interference with an attorney's judgment
if legal services are the primary purpose of the organization.102
Others, however, take the view that less risk exists.10 8 In either
case, a prohibition of interference with an attorney's judgment by
the group plan would better meet the standards of a narrowly
drawn restriction.
DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v) 104 requires a closed panel plan to reim-
burse a member who chooses to hire an outside attorney, to the
97. ABA ConE, DR2-104(A).
98. HousToN AMENDMENTs, DR2-103(D) (5) (a) (i)-(ii); see Appendix
1 infra.
99. Under the Houston Amendments open panel plans' primary pur-
pose could be "the recommending, furnishing, rendering of or paying for
legal services of all kinds." HOUSTON AMENDmINTs, DR2-103 (D) (5) (b)
(i); see Appendix 1 infra.
100. E.g., labor unions.
101. The same argument is made concerning similar provisions in the
1969 Code in Comment, Group Legal Services in Oklahoma, 26 OKLA. L.
Rxv. 252, 258-59 (1973).
102. See Memorandum from the General Practice Section to the House
of Delegates regarding the Ethics Committee's Proposed Amendments to
DR2-103 (D) of the Code (Feb. 1974).
103. Comment, Group Legal Services in Oklahoma, 26 OKLA. L. REv.
252, 258-59 (1973).
104. HOUSTON AMEDMENTS, DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v); see Appendix 1
infra.
extent such services would have cost the organization. This amend-
ment is totally devoid of ethical objectives. Rather, it is a method
of limiting closed panel plans. The restriction undermines the
closed plan concept, which is based on economies of scale and maxi-
mum use of personnel through specialization. Although it is argued
that this gives a member freedom of choice, "it really denies ...
the right to select a plan that is wholly and entirely a closed panel
plan."105
The filing requirements of DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (viii) 101 imposed
on closed plans are not necessarily objectionable. A lawyer's fidu-
ciary duty to his client,107 combined with the public nature of these
plans, makes a strict review of group legal services organizations
especially important. These requirements are objectionable, how-
ever, in that they are applied discriminatorily. Open panel plans
also should be scrutinized carefully because they are also suscep-
tible to abuse.108
The final discriminatory restriction adopted at Houston is DR2-
103 (D) (5) (a) (i),109 which prohibits closed panel plans from oper-
ating for profit, or from providing a profit or commercial benefit
to its parent organization.110 Whether this restriction is valid de-
pends on whether the combination of the profit motive and the
greater possibility of conflicts of interest associated with closed
plans so increases the probability of abuse that the prohibition is
necessary. It must be remembered that there is a presumption
against the prohibition of group legal services plans, which arises
from the importance of the services they provide."' With no con-
crete evidence to support the claim that such a rule is needed to
prevent abuse," 2 the amendment is hard to justify. Even if some
danger is hypothesized, overly broad restrictions should be avoided.
Restrictions can be narrowly devised to detect and punish ethical
105. McCalpin, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal
Services Plans Get an Airing Before the Tunney Committee, 60 A.B.A.J.
791, 796 (1974). See Baron & Cole, Real Freedom of Choice for the Con-
sumer of Legal Services, 58 MASs. L.Q. 253, 256 (1973).
106. HOUSTON AMENDMENTS, DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (viii); see Appendix 1
infra.
107. AiBA CODE, CANON 5 n.1.
108. Filing could locate organizations that charge excessively or deliver
poor service. Overly large profits could be a violation of ABA CODE, DR2-
106 (A): "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect
an illegal or clearly excessive fee." Poor service may be a violation of ABA
CODE, DR6-101 (A) (2): "A lawyer shall not... handle a legal matter with-
out preparation adequate to the circumstances." The abuses which can be
detected by filing may vary with each plan.
109. HOUSTON AMENDMENT, DR2-103(D) (5) (a) (i); see Appendix 1
infra.
110. Id., DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (iii); see Appendix 1 infra.
111. The burden of proof is on those who would prohibit a group legal
services plan. 1969 Report, supra note 30, at 704.
112. See note 91 supra.
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violations by group legal plans. The prohibition of profit-making
groups that do not interfere with their attorneys' independent judg-
ments cannot be justified in light of the public's need of legal ser-
vices."13
V. -THE CHICAGO AMENDMENTS'
14
The discriminatory amendments adopted at Houston were ve-
hemently attacked as unconstitutional,'1 5 economically motivated'"
and as violative of the nation's antitrust laws.1 1 7  The Chicago
113. On treating violations by organizations on a case-to-case basis see
Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966, 976
(1967).
114. At the Chicago convention proposals for amending the ABA CODE
(see note 1 supra) as modified by the HousTON AMIDMENTS (text at Ap-
pendix 1 infra) were made by the special committee which had been cre-
ated at Honolulu. With the approval of the amendments they became the
official policy of the A.B.A. They do not become operative in any state,
however, until adopted by that state. As only Tennessee and Kansas have
approved the Houston Amendments, 1 Tamns iN LEGAL SERvicEs, Oct. 1974,
cited in, Comment, Legal Services Plans-Coming of Age, 49 ST. JOHN L.
REv. 137, 165 n.146, the ABA CODE provisions concerning group legal services
generally remain in effect until the states act on the Chicago Amendments.
The amendments are found in SummAnY or AcTION AND REPORT TO THE
HOUSE or DELEGATES, 1975 MIDYEAR MEETING, Report No. 110. They are here-
inafter cited as CmcAco AMENDMENTS. The text may be found in Appendix
2 infra.
115. "[I]n many respects, the recent amendment to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility does not meet the [Constitutional] requirement of a
precise, narrowly-defined regulation designed to protect a clearly perceived
valid public interest." Tunney Memorandum, supra note 14, at 10, quoting
F. William McCalpin.
116. "[N]arrow ... segments of the organized bar ... are seeking pri-
marily to preserve their pocketbooks without regard to the best interests
of the consuming public." Id. at 11, quoting Ralph Nader.
117. If in modifying the disciplinary rules to permit participation
in both open and closed plans, the state bar discriminates in favor
of open plans, anti-trust violations could arise .... Of course, it
need not, if the state bar associations do not follow the American
Bar Association's proposed amendments and adopt the non-discrim-
inatory rules proposed by the Antitrust Division or by the Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
Id. at 2-3, quoting Bruce W. Wilcon; see note 14 supra.
Undoubtedly the discriminatory proposals that restrict the competitive-
ness of closed panel plans are contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws,
whose purpose is to "preserve competitive markets in which consumers will
be provided sufficient choices in terms of price, quality and service in con-
nection with the goods and services they receive." Address by J. Bernstein,
Transcript of the National Conference on the Future of Prepaid Legal
Services, at 139 (1973). Similar restrictions imposed on closed panel medi-
cal plans were found to violate the antitrust laws. AMA v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
The Supreme Court may have foreclosed this issue, however, by its de-
amendments are a response to these criticisms in that they treat
both open and closed plans on equal terms. This nondiscriminatory
approach is evident in the new definitions adopted at Chicago. The
Houston amendments treated closed plans as unqualified legal as-
sistance organizations and subjected them to greater regulation.118
Under the new amendments, however, both open and closed panel
plans are considered qualified organizations.' 19
This change is emphasized by the revision of EC2-33.120 This
ethical consideration, adopted at Houston, recognized the protection
closed plans have received by the Supreme Court. The considera-
tion viewed such plans, however, as evils to be avoided by attorneys
"interested in maintaining the historic traditions of the profession
and preserving the function of a lawyer as a trusted and indepen-
dent advisor."'121 The new consideration, however, encourages at-
torneys to cooperate with qualified group legal plans, whether open
or closed. Closed plans are not broadly condemned; the considera-
tion warns attorneys of abuses which may develop in any group
legal plan, and advises attorneys to avoid any particular organiza-
tion where abuses develop.
cision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Chief Justice Stone wrote:
"We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 351. This holding applies
to judicial directives as well as legislative ones. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 496 (E.D. Va. 1973). Although state activity is pro-
tected by the statute, the state cannot lend its immunity from prosecution
under the statute to a private party by declaring his actions lawful. Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). The crucial question then is where the
boundaries of state action lie under Parker v. Brown. It has been suggested
that the boundaries are considerably narrower than in the fourteenth
amendment cases. Comment, The Bar as Trade Association, 5 HAv. C1V.
Rrc;HTs-Cnr. LiB. L. REv. 334, 339 (1970). Authorization of the Houston
Amendments by a state supreme court or legislature might not qualify as
state action under Parker v. Brown, if "It can be shown that such enactment
represents an unconsidered favor to a private interest." Ferran & Snyder,
Antitrust and Ethical Aspects of Lawyers' Minimum Fee Schedules, 7 REAL
ROPETY, PROBATE, AND TRUST J. 726, 731 (1972).
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973),
however, a different test was applied: whether the authority of the organ-
ization "would have become operative without any command from the
legislature or the Supreme Court" Id. at 495. The court ruled that a state
bar's disciplinary procedures were not intended to come under the purview
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 496. Under the Goldfarb test, if the Houston
Amendments were approved by a state supreme court, the approval would
constitute state action sufficient to exempt the amendments from the
Sherman Act.
118. See HousToN AxsmENns at Appendix 1 infra.
119. CaxCAGo AMEN MENTs, DFTION No. 8; see Appendix 2 infra.
120. Id., EC2-33; see Appendix 2 infra.,
121. "There is substantial danger that lawyers rendering services under
legal services plans which do not permit the beneficiaries to select their
own attorneys will not be ableto meet these standards." HousroN AMEND-
MENTs, EC2-33; see Appendix. 1 infra.
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The new attitude towards closed plans resulted in several speci-
fic changes in the ABA Code:
(1) DR2-104 (A) (3),122 adopted at Houston, had precluded an
attorney employed by a closed panel plan from representing a plan
member on non-plan matters. This provision was deleted at Chi-
cago. As a result, both open and closed panel attorneys may repre-
sent their plan members on non-plan matters, as long as the attor-
neys have not solicited such employment. 123 The open or closed
plan attorney may give unsolicited advice and represent the client,
however, on a plan-relateal matter. 124 Both type plans are subject
to the new DR2-103 (D) (4) (c),125 which provides that group legal
plans cannot be "operated for the purpose of procuring legal work
. . . for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of the legal
services program of the organization. 1u 26 This provision, aimed at
specific unethical conduct, is a significant improvement over the
Houston provision which had the effect of banning innocent as well
as unethical conduct.1
27
(2) DR2-104(A) (2),128 whose language is unchanged in the
Chicago amendments, allows a lawyer to accept employment "that
results from his participation in activities designed to educate lay-
men ... if such activities are conducted or sponsored by a qualified
legal assistance organization.' 29  With the broadening of the
definition of a qualified legal assistance organization the provision
now applies to activities sponsored by both open and closed panel
plans. 130 An attorney is still prohibited from soliciting business
during his participation in such an educational activity.
13 1
(3) Other provisions deleted at Chicago include DR2-103 (D)
122. CMCAGO AMENDMmENTs, DR2-104(A) (3); see Appendix 2 infra.
123. ABA Cons, DR2-104 (A); see note 1 supra. This introductory para-
graph was not changed by either the Houston or Chicago amendments.
124. CICAGO AMENMmENTS, DR2-104(A) (4); see Appendix 2 infra.
125. Id., DR2-103 (D) (4) (c); see Appendix 2 infra.
126. Id.
127. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
128. HOUSTON AmENDME TS, DR2-104 (A) (2); see Appendix 1 infra.
129. Id.
130. For example, an attorney participates in a seminar sponsored by
a group legal plan to educate laymen on the importance of having a will.
After the meeting is over, a person who attended the seminar asks the attor-
ney to draft a will for him. Under the new amendments the attorney may
accept the offer, regardless of whether the sponsoring organization was a
closed or open panel plan.
131. ABA CODE> DR2-104(A). The exceptions to the general rule pro-
hibiting solicitation do not extend this far.
132. HOUSTON AMENDm TS, DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) - (ii); see Appendix
1 infra.
(5) (a) (i) - (ii) ,132 which had required closed panel plans to be inci-
dental but reasonably related to large, non-legal parent organiza-
tions, e.g., labor unions. With the deletion, closed panel organiza-
tions can be set up for the sole purpose of providing legal services
and need not be related to any parent organization. Interested citi-
zens may now initiate closed as well as open plans to secure com-
petent, affordable legal services.
(4) DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v),' " which had required closed panel
plans to reimburse any member who chose to hire an outside attor-
ney, was substantially modified at Chicago. The new provision,
DR2-103(D) (4) (e), 13 4 applies uniformly to both open and closed
panel plans. It requires that members be reimbursed for the fees
of outside counsel only if "representation by counsel furnished,
selected or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate
under the circumstances."' 35 While the old provision attempted to
inhibit all closed panel plans, the new amendment requires reim-
bursement under limited circumstances and would only detrimen-
tally affect plans which provide poor or inadequate service.
(5) The new DR2-103(D) (4) (g)13 6 requires all group legal ser-
vices plans to file certain information with the approriate discipli-
nary authority. Such a requirement is a small burden on group
legal plans and provides the disciplinary authority with "the mini-
mal information necessary to supervise the conduct of attorneys"" 7
in such programs. Under the Houston amendments this provision
applied only to closed plans.138 As any type of legal organization
is subject to abuse if unregulated, the change is a welcome one.
Another important difference is that under the old code a lawyer
could be disciplined for cooperating with a closed plan which had
not properly filed. Under the new amendment, discipline would
only occur if a group attorney knows or has cause to know of the
violation. This knowledge test is also applied to DR2-103 (D) (4) (f),
which requires organizations to be in accordance with local rules
of court. 1 39
By eliminating needlessly broad restrictions on closed panel
plans, the Chicago amendments bring the Code more in conformance
with ethical and constitutional requirements. There is one amend-
133. Id., DR2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v); see Appendix 1 infra.
134. CHICAGO AMENDMENTS, DR2-103 (D) (4) (e); see Appendix 2 infra.
135. Id.
136. Id., DR2-103(D) (4) (g); see note 112 supra.
137. SuMMARY OF AcT3ioN AND REPORTS T THE HOUSE OF DELEcATEs, 1975
MIDYEA" MEETiNG, Report No. 110, Appendix at 8, Comments.
138. HOUSTON AMEDMENTS, DR2-103(D) (5) (a) (viii); see Appendix 1
inf ra.
139. COympare CMCAGo Armmirrs, DR2-103(D) (4) (f), at Appendix
2 infra, with HousTON AMErNMENTS, DRt2-103 (D) (5) (a) (vi) and DR2-103
(D) (5) (b) (iii) at Appendix 1 infm.
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ment, however, which is bound to cause a controversy. The new
DR2-103 (D) (4) (a) reads:
Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized
and operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendi-
tion of legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organiza-
tion is organized for profit, the legal services are not ren-
dered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected
by it except in connection with matters where such organi-
zation bears ultimate liability of its member or benefici-
ary.1
40
The amendment is poorly drafted and difficult to interpret. It
should be read, however, as a general prohibition on all profit ori-
ented plans followed by specific exceptions to the rule. Closed
panel, profit oriented plans are prohibited except for the narrow ex-
ception of a plan which bears the "ultimate liability of its member
or beneficiary.' 41  Open panel plans are more widely excepted
from the prohibition, but attorneys working under such a plan may
not be directed or supervised by the organization.
142
The amendment is premised on the fear of the "potential for
interference with the independent exercise of the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment to enhance [the organization's] profit.' 14 3 The
prohibition includes, therefore, not only closed plans where attor-
neys are employed directly by the group legal services plan, but
also those open plans where attorneys are supervised or directed.
The restriction is based on legitimate ethical concerns; it is sub-
mitted, however, that abuses which may arise in profit oriented
plans should be dealt with through restrictions narrowly drawn and
aimed directly at the unethical conduct. The bar is constitutionally
mandated to avoid prohibitions of innocent activity based on theo-
retical possibilities of abuse. 1 4 ' With this one exception, the Chi-
cago amendments conform to this mandate. If profit oriented
plans violate DR2-103 (D) ,14 they should be disciplined and, if the
violations are persistent, disbanded. "There would be little quarrel
with the courts or bar associations if they [punish] those group
legal efforts which [sacrifice] their clients' interest.' 146 If a profit
140. CHICAGO AMENDMENTS, DR2-103 (D) (4) (a); see Appendix 2 inlra.
141. Id.
142. SUMMARY Or ACTION AD RroRTs To Tmm HousE OF DELEGATES, 1975
MIDYEAR MEETING, Report No. 110, Appendix at 6, Comments.
143. Id.
144. See notes 120-146 and accompanying text supra.
145. I.e. the rules applicable to all bona fide group legal services organ-
izations.
146. Zimroth, Group Legal Semites and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J.
966, 974 (1967).
plan is competitive and operates in accordance with the ABA Code,
however, there is no reason why it should be prohibited.
VI. CONCLUSION
Group legal services were born out of the public's need for ac-
cessible and affordable legal services. 147 Like the bar itself, how-
ever, such plans are subject to abuse if not regulated. The major
ethical concern is the possibility of interference with an attorney's
judgment by a legal services organization. 148  The need for group
legal services among moderate-income Americans and the protec-
tion given such plans by the Supreme Court dictate a policy of
drafting narrow regulations to prevent specific unethical prac-
tices.
149
The Chicago amendments represent a significant advance for
group legal services. The amendments treat both open and closed
panel plans on a nondiscriminatory basis and generally narrow re-
strictions to prevent specific abuses. By this action they bring the
Code into substantial compliance with ethical and constitutional re-
quirements. The removal of broad restrictions on profit oriented
plans would complete this process, allowing group legal services to
proceed with their duty of serving the public.
J. ROBERT KAMER II
147. 1969 Report, supra note 30, at 704.
148. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 55-58 and 120-146 and- accompanying text supra.
APPENDIX
1. The HouSToN AMENDMENTS.
DR2-101. Publicity in General.
(A) * * *
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone direc-
tories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he author-
ize or permit others to do so in his behalf, except that a lawyer
recommended by, paid by, or whose legal services are furnished
by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103 (D)
(1) through (5) may authorize or permit or assist such organiza-
tion to use such means of commercial publicity, which does not
identify any lawyer by name, to describe the availability or nature
of its legal services or legal service benefits. This rule does not
prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer as a law-
yer as well as by name:
(1) - (5) * * *
(6) In private communications by any of the offices or organ-
izations enumerated in ,DR 2-103(D) (1) through (5), along
with the biographical information permitted under DR 2-102
(A) (6), in response to inquiries from a member or beneficiary
of such office or organization.
(C) * * *
DR 2-103. Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) * * *
(B) **
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend
or promote the use of his services or those of his partner or associ-
ate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a
private practitioner, except that:
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer referral service
operated, sponsored, or approved by a bat association repre-
sentative of the general bar of the geographical area in which
the association exists and may pay its fees incident thereto.
(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of
the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1)
through (5) and may perform legal services for those to whom
he was recommended by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a
member or beneficiary of such office or organization; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of his client without direction
or regulation by the organization or any person connected
with it.
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that
furnishes, or pays for legal services to others, to promote the use of
his services or those of his partner, associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private practitioner,
except as permitted in DR 2-101(B). However, this does not
prohibit a lawyer, or his partner, associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, from being employed or paid by, or
cooperating with, one of the following offices or organizations that
promote the use of his services or those of his partner, associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private
practitioner, if his independent professional judgment is exercised
in behalf of his client without interference or control by any
organization or other person:
(1) - (3) * * *
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the
geographical area in which the association exists or an organ-
ization operated, sponsored or approved by such a bar associ-
ation.
(5) Any other organization that furnishes, renders, or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries, provided the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) As to such organizations other than a qualified legal
assistance organization:
(i) Such organization is not organized for profit and its
primary purposes do not include the recommending,
furnishing, rendering of or paying for legal services.
(ii) Said services must be only incidental and reason-
ably related to the primary purposes of such organ-
ization.
(iii) Such organization or its parent or affiliated organ-
ization does not derive a profit or commercial bene-
fit from the rendition of legal services by the
lawyer.
(iv) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal
services are rendered, and not such organization, is
recognized as the client of the lawyer in that matter.
(v) Any of the organization's members or beneficiaries
is free to select counsel of his or her own choice,
provided that if such independent selection is made
by the client, then such organization, if it custom-
arily provides legal services through counsel it pre-
selects, shall promptly reimburse the member or
beneficiary in the fair and equitable amount said
services would have cost such organization if ren-
dered by counsel selected by said organization.
(vi) Such organization is in compliance with all appli-
cable laws, rules of court and other legal require-
ments that govern its operations.
(vii) The lawyer, or his partner, associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, shall not
have initiated such organization for the purpose in
whole or in part, of providing financial or other
benefits to him or to them.
(viii) The articles of organization, by-laws, agreement
with counsel, and the schedule of benefits and sub-
scription charges are filed along with any amend-
ments or changes within sixty (60) days of the
effective date with the court or other authority
having final jurisdiction for the discipline of law-
yers within the state, and within sixty (60 ) days
of the end of each fiscal year a financial statement
showing, with respect to its legal service activities
the income received and the expenses and benefits




(ix) Provided, however, that any non-profit organiza-
zation which is organized to secure and protect
Constitutionally guaranteed rights shall be exempt
from the requirements of (v) and (viii).
(b) As to a qualified legal assistance organization (not
described in DR 2-102 (D) (1)-(4):
(i) The primary purpose of such organization may be
profit or non-profit and it may include the recom-
mending, furnishing, rendering of or paying for
legal services of all kinds.
(ii) The member or beneficiary, for whom the legal
services are rendered, and not such organization, is
recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.
(iii) Such organization is in compliance with all ap-
plicable laws, rules of court and other legal require-
ments that govern its operations.
(iv) The lawyer, or his partner, associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, shall not
have initiated such organization for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of providing financial or other
benefits to him or to them.
(E) * **
DR 2-104. Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employ-
ment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) * * *
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his par-
ticipation in activities designed to educate laymen to recognize
legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to
utilize available legal services if such activities are conducted
or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance organization.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by any of
the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1)
through (5) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof,
to the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein. A
lawyer whose legal services are currently being recommended,
furnished or paid for by a legal assistance organization defined
in DR 2-103 (D) (5) (a) may not accept employment as a pri-
vate practitioner from a member or beneficiary of such a
legal assistance organization in any matter not covered by the
benefits provided under the plan of such organization when
such member or beneficiary has been his client under such
plan.
(4) - (5) * * *
Definitions
(1) - (6) * * *
(7) "A Bar association representative of the general bar of the
geographical area in which the association exists" is a bar
association, the membership of which is open to any lawyer
in good standing in the geographical area and which has a
membership at least equal to the lesser of three hundred (300)
members or twenty (20) percent of the lawyers licensed to
practice in the geographical area. A bar association of special-
. ists as referred to in DR 2-105(a) (1) or (4) is "a bar associa-
tion representative of the general bar" even though it does not
meet the test of the preceding sentence.
(8) "Qualified legal assistance organization" is an organization
described in DR 2-103(D) (l)-(4) or which recommends, fur-
nishes, renders or pays for legal services to its members or
beneficiaries under a plan operated, administered or funded by
an insurance company or other organization which plan pro-
vides that the members or beneficiaries may select their
counsel from lawyers representative of the general bar of the
geographical area in which the plan is offered.
(9) "Lawyers representative of the general bar of the geographical
area in which the plan is offered" are lawyers in good stand-
ing numbering not less than the greater of three hundred (300)
or twenty (20) percent of those licensed to practice in the
geographical area.
EC 2-33 Several Supreme Court decisions apparently give Constitu-
tional protection to certain organizations which furnish certain legal
services to their member under legal service plans which do not provide
free choice in the selection of attorneys. The basic tenets of the profes-
sion, according to EC 1-1 are independence, integrity and competence of
the lawyer and total devotion to the interests of the client. There is sub-
stantial danger that lawyers rendering services under legal service plans
which do not permit the beneficiaries to select their own attorneys will
not be able to meet these standards. The independence of the lawyer
may be seriously affected by the fact that he is employed by the group
and by virtue of that employment cannot give his full devotion to the
interest of the member he represents. The group which employs the
attorney will inevitably have the characteristic of a "lay intermediary"
because of its cqntrol over the attorney inherent in the employment
relationship. It is probable that attorneys employed by groups will be
directed as to what cases they may handle and in the manner in which
they handle the cases referred to them. It is also possible that the
standards of the profession and quality of legal service to the public will
suffer because consideration of economy rather than experience and
competence will determine the attorneys to be employed by the group.
An attorney interested in maintaining the historic traditions of the pro-
fession and preserving the function of a lawyer as a trusted and inde-
pendent advisor to individual members of society should carefully con-
sider the risks involved before accepting employment by groups under
plans which do not provide their members with a free choice of counsel.
For a discussion of the HOUSTON AMENDMENTS, see note 83 supra.
2. The CesCAGo AMENDMENTS
DR 2-101. Publicity in General.
(A) * * *
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or tele-
vision announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf. However, a lawyer
recommended by, paid by or whose legal services are furnished by,
a qualified legal assistance organization may authorize or permit or
assist such organization to use means of dignified commercial pub-
licity, which does not identify any lawyer by name, to describe
the availability or nature of its legal services or legal services
benefits. This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identi-
fication of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) - (5) * * *
(6) In communications by a qualified legal assistance organization,
Comments
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along with the biographical information permitted under
DR 2-102 (A) (6), directed to a member or beneficiary of such
organization.
(C) * * *
DR 2-103. Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) * * *
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a
person or organization to recommend or secure his employment
by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation
resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may pay
the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of the organ-
ization listed in DR 2-103 (D).
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend
or promote the use of his services or those of his partner or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a
private practititioner, except that:
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer referral service oper-
ated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay
its fees incident thereto.
(2) He may cooperate with the legal service activities of any of
the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103 (D) (1)
through (4) and may perform legal services for those to whom
he was recommended by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a
member or beneficiary of such office or organization; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of his client.
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that
furnishes or pays for legal services to others to promote the use of
his services or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm from being recommended, employed
or paid by, or cooperating with, one of the following offices or
organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm if there is no interference with the exercise of independent
professional judgment in behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit com-
munity organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by
a bar association.
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays
for legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized
and operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendi-
tion of legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organiza-
tion is organized for profit, the legal services are not
rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or
selected by it except in connection with matters where
such organization bears ultimate liability of its member
or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-
lawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such organization
for the primary purpose of providing financial or other
benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated
lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of pro-
curing legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a
practitioner outside of the legal services program of the
organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services
are furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as
client of the lawyer in the matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal
services furnished or paid for by the organization may, if
such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other
than that furnished, selected or approved by the organiza-
tion for the particular matter involved; and the legal
service plan of such organization provides appropriate
relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim
that representation by counsel furnished, selected or
approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate
under the circumstances of the matter involved and the
plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such
relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that
such organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules
of court and other legal requirements that govern its legal
service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disci-
plinary authority at least annually a report with respect
to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its
schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements
with counsel, financial results of its legal service activities
or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not know or
have cause to know of such failure.
DR 2-104. Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
(A) * * *
(1) * * *
(2) * *
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a quali-
fied legal assistance organization enumerated in DR 2-103
(D) (1) through (4) may represent a member or beneficiary
thereof, to the extent and under the conditions prescribed
therein.
Definitions
(1) - (6) * * *
(7) "A Bar Association" includes a bar association of specialists as
referred to in DR 2-105(A) (1) or (4).
(8) "Qualified legal assistance organization" means an office or
organization of one of the four types listed in DR 2-103




EC 2-33 As a part of the legal profession's commitment to the principle
that high quality legal services should be available to all, attorneys are
encouraged to cooperate with qualified legal assistance organizations
providing prepaid legal services. Such participation should at all times
be in accordance with the basic tenets of the profession: independence,
integrity, competence and devotion to the interests of individual clients.
An attorney so participating should make certain that his relationship
with a qualified legal assistance organization in no way interferes with
his independent, professional representation of the interests of the
individual client. An attorney should avoid situations in which officials
of the organization who are not lawyers attempt to direct attorneys
concerning the manner in which legal services are performed for indi-
vidual members, and should also avoid situations in which considerations
of economy are given undue weight in determining the attorneys em-
ployed by an organization or the legal services to be performed for the
member or beneficiary rather than competence and quality of service.
An attorney interested in maintaining the historic traditions of the
profession and preserving the function of a lawyer as a trusted and
independent advisor to individual members of society should carefully
assess such factors when accepting employment by, or otherwise par-
ticipating in, a particular qualified legal assistance organization, and
while so participating should adhere to the highest professional standards
of effort and competence.
,For a discussion of the CHICAGO AMENDMENTS, see note 114 supra.
